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The Impact of the Village Government Law (UU No. 51979) in Bali 
Policy statements on rural development in New Order Indonesia devote 
considerable attention to engaging the participation of the rural population. 
To some extent this rhetorical posturing reflects a recognition of the central 
government's real dependence on local organisation in the realisation of its 
political and economic agenda. The policy outlines for Repelita IV  and V 
state  that  the  greatest  attention  must  be  given  to  furthering  rural 
development  by  increasing  the  participation  (partisipasi  masyarakat), 
preparedness (prakarsa) and self-reliance (swadaya) of village society (GBHN 
1983:56;  1988:56-57). The Department of Home Affairs proclaims the desa 
(village)  the "bulwark.  .  .for implementing Pancasila,"  "the site for  guiding 
and  increasing  the  spirit of gotong  royong"  and  the  "pillar  of public 
participation  in  all  facets  of  government,  development  and  society" 
(Depdagri 1986b:2). The emphasis on popular participation and local self-
reliance in economic development does not extend to the political sphere, 
however. 
The rhetoric of participation is  contradicted by ingrained assumptions 
regarding the limited capacities of a traditionally oriP.nted rural populace to 
deal with modern social change and by the higher priority given to insuring 
central government hegemony in all aspects of the political process. These 
instrumental priorities and paternalistic perceptions are reflected in central 
government policies on the bureaucratisation of village-level government 
throughout  Indonesia.  Through  the  1979  Village  Government  Law 
(Undang-Undang  Republik  Indonesia  No.5  Tahun  1979  tentang 
Pemerintahan Desa - henceforth UU 5/79)1  and subsequent ministerial 
regulations over the last decade a  thoroughgoing reorganisation has been 
undertaken,  coopting  local  government in the name of more efficient 
development. 
This paper considers the internal contradictions in Indonesian state policy 
toward local government. As a case in point, it focuses on the impact of the 
1979 legislation on village institutions in Bali  where traditional forms of 
organisation  such  as  the  banjar  (hamlet)  operating  within  the 
administrative village (desa)  have proved themselves valuable in engaging 
precisely the self-help participation which has enhanced the effectiveness 
and reduced  costs  to  the state of implementing its  rural  development 
policies.2 
1 'Re-forming' Local Administration 
The 1979  Village  Government Law sets out to establish  uniform local 
administrative structures across  Indonesia with the stated objectives  of 
increasing  the  level  of  public  participation  in  development  and  the 
effectiveness  of village  administration,  the  weight of emphasis  falling 
heavily on the latter. According to the explanatory notes appended to the 
legislation, the previously existing heterogeneous situation in which each 
region had its own style of local organisation constituted an obstacle to the 
"guidance and intensive direction" necessary to an improved standard of 
living and to the effective conduct of government (UU 5/1979, penjelasan).3 
Some features of the legislation, such as those related to the regularisation 
of local  voting practice, financial  accountability, involvement of women 
and the role of village councils appear at first sight to offer positive reforms 
to aspects of desa-level administration. Apparently some of these changes 
were introduced in response to criticism of the fairly monolithic authority 
structure which developed historically around the position of desa head 
(lurah)  in Java  (Zacharias  1979;  Breman  1982;  Schulte  Nordholt 1982; 
Tjondronegoro 1984).4  Unfortunately, most of the changes, undermined by 
elitist presuppositions and an overriding concern with drawing the village 
more firmly into the orbit of state "guidance and control", have had the 
reverse effect of reinforcing the powers of this position. 
The bureaucratisation of local leadership -Under the 1979 law the village 
head,  kepala  desa,  becomes the sole popularly chosen leader in the local 
government  hierarchy  (See  Figure  1).  The  legislation  and  associated 
regulations  specify  in  some  detail  the  responsibilities  of  this  office, 
procedures for  election and limits on tenure (UU 5/79, §4-10;  Mendagri 
6/81). The kepala desa is to hold office for an eight year term and may be 
reelected for only one additional term. Under normal circumstances at least 
two candidates must contest elections for village head. In the event of a 
single nominee, regulations require the provision of an unmarked ballot 
box to permit voters to reject a sole candidate.s 
On the one hand, these provisions should work against the monopolization 
of local office. In a number of instances where individuals had dominated 
local  government  for  decades,  regulations  !imitating  office  holding 
provided the opportunity to replace them and in some communities to alter 
the local balance of power. On the other hand, supra-village scrutiny of 
candidates at kecamatan  (district) and kabupaten  (regional) levels during the 
mandatory 'screening' process severely limits local autonomy in choosing 
the village head,6 and the powers vested in that position leave little scope 
for  the expression of other political  perspectives in the local  decision-
making process. All other village functionaries are nominated or appointed 
directly by the kepala desa. 
2 Figure 1  LOCAL  GOVERNMENT AD:MINISTRATIVE HIERARCHY 
UNDER THE VILLAGE GOVERNMENT LAW  (Undang-Undang No.51979) 
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government official responsible at each level. 
*The sub-Dusun units Rukun Warga and Rukun Tetangga were created by 
a subsequent decree of the Minister of the Home Affairs (Mendagri 7 /1983) 
and are not mentioned in the original law. 
More critical for local  community organisation, and especially the role of 
the banjar in Bali,  are  those provisions of the  1979 law concerning the 
manner of selection of sub-desa leadership. Under the legislation hamlet 
heads (formerly klian  dinas,  now called kepala  dusun)  are to be appointed 
by superordinate authorities with indefinite tenure, instead of elected by 
their banjar for five-year terms of office as was previous practice. From the 
point of view of public involvement, the hamlet in Bali (that is the banjar 
dinas, called dusun7  under the new law) is more important than the desas. 
Tjondronegoro (1984:236) makes an analogous case for Java. 
Despite  the  policy  focus  on  the  desa  as  the  smallest  unit  of  local 
administration since colonial times, the administrative desa has no direct 
basis in local organisation. The real foundation of local social and political 
life in Bali  is  actually the banjar, where direct popular participation in 
decision-making  through  monthly  banjar  meetings  (sangkepan) is a 
customary feature of local politics. In the post-colonial framework, elected 
3 klian  dinas  represented  banjar  interests  on village  councils.  This  key 
representative link  to the popularly based banjar  units,  critical  to  the 
effective functioning of the administrative desa, is broken under the 1979 
legislation. Heads of dusun are henceforth to be appointed by the camat, a 
civil-servant who normally comes from outside the district he heads, from 
nominees submitted by the kepala desa (§16). 
The  transformation  of  local  government  into  an  arm  of  the  central 
bureaucracy is more thoroughgoing still among those villages which have 
their  status  changed  from  'desa'  to 'kelurahan'.  As  defined  in  the 
legislation, kelurahan are distinguished from desa by virtue of the fact that 
they "do not have the right to conduct their own affairs" (UU 5/79, §1).9 In 
consequence,  kelurahan  lose  control  over  their  leadership  and  over 
financial affairs. While at least the kepala desa as head of government in the 
desa formation remains an elected official, this does not apply to the kepala 
kelurahan (lurah)  as head of an 'upgraded' village. In the latter structure, 
officials  at  both  village  (kelurahan)  and  hamlet  (in  this  case  called 
lingkungan)10  level  are  to  become  appointed  civil  servants  who have 
unlimited  tenure  of office  and  whose obligations  are entirely  to  the 
administrative hierarchy (UU 5/79, §24,31). 
Criteria for  designation as kelurahan are primarily the degree of relative 
modernisation of a village and its centrality to the administrative hierarchy. 
For example, desa in urban areas and those located at the seat of regional or 
district administration (kabupaten  or kecamatan)  have been the first to be 
reclassified. By 1984, of 594 administrative desa in Bali, 79 had their status 
changed to kelurahan. Balinese regional and provincial officials responsible 
for implementing the legislation expressed the expectation that eventually 
kelurahan would become the predominant form of village organisation in 
Indonesia. 
Apparently a  thoroughgoing bureaucratisation of local government along 
the lines of the kelurahan model had been the original intention of the 
legislation. According to Schulte Nordholt, the Minister of Home Affairs 
planned  to incorporate  all  village  heads  within  the  civil  service  and 
eliminate elections (1985:15). Financial considerations dictated against this 
move and in the final form of the legislation these cbanges were restricted 
to a  smaller number of centrally located and administratively strategic 
villages designated as kelurahan. 
Desa  councils  - The structure and role of village councils under the 1979 
Village Government Law further reflects  the contradictory objectives  of 
central  government  policy  toward  popular  participation. In  place  of 
previously existing village  councils, which had been brought under the 
uniform label of Lembaga  Sosial  Desa  (LSD) by the Ministry of the Home 
Affairs in 1972 (lnst Mendagri 5/1972), two bodies have been created: the 
Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa  (LKMD  - Village  Public  Security 
Council)  and Lembaga  Musyawarah Desa  (LMD  - Village  Consultative 
Council) (UU 5/79 §17; Mendagri 27 /1984; Depdagri 1986a,1986b). 
4 The LKMD, a  predominantly elected council operating in both desa and 
kelurahan, is intended to provide the main organ for public participation in 
development. In replacing the previously established Lembaga Sosial Desa 
(LSD  Village Social Council), its allegedly expanded role.  is to "activate 
public participation to carry out development in a coordinated way whether 
it originates from  various  government activities or through community 
self-help  initiatives  (swadaya  gotong  royong  masyarakat)"  (Mendagri 
27/1984, §2-3). The kepala desa/kelurahan is ex-officio head (ketua  umum), 
assisted by a  'prominent villager' (pemuka)  as First Officer (ketua I) and by 
the head of the women's organisation, the PKK (specified as the wife of the 
kepala desa) as Second Officer (ketua  II - See Figure 2). Members of the 
LKMD are to be nominated through public deliberations in each dusun or 
lingkungan and elected at a public meeting of the desa/kelurahan. They are 
confirmed for a period of service of five years by the bupati via the kepala 
desa/kelurahan and carnat and are responsible to the village head (§6-8). 
Figure 2 
ORGANIZATIONAL  STRUCTURE  - LKMD 
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Source:  Attachment  to  Keputusan  Menteri  Dalam  Negeri,  Nov. 27, 1984 
The  LMD,  The  Village  Consultative Council,  which  does  not exist  in 
villages  designated as kelurahan, is  charged with "realising  Pancasila 
Democracy in local  government"  and "conveying the aspirations of the 
village public" (UU 5/79, §17, notes; Mendagri 2/1981; Depdagri 1986b:29). It 
5 has the authority to deliberate on and approve all  decisions (keputusan 
desa)  of  the  kepala  desa,  to  constitute  the  Electoral  Committee  for 
nominating candidates and conducting the election of kepala desa, and to 
advise the kepala desa concerning the nomination of candidates for desa 
secretary and kepala dusun (Mendagri 2/1981; Depdagri 1986b:10). The LMD 
is required to meet at least once a year to receive the report of the kepala 
desa, and to approve keputusan  desa,  including the budget (APPKD). The 
head of the LMD  (as  of  the  LKMD)  is  also  the kepala  desa  and  its 
membership is to be comprised of an equal number of kepala dusun, leaders 
of important local social institutions and prominent villagers (UU 5/79,§17). 
Given  that  the  LMD  is  supposed  to  realise  'democracy'll  in  local 
government, it is  more than ironic  that aside from the kepala desa, its 
members are not elected and have indefinite terms of appointment. It is the 
kepala desa who nominates the members of the LMD in consultation with 
'prominent persons' in the village (UU 5/1979, §17).  Since the kepala desa 
appoints the LMD and is in turn nominated by it (Depdagri1986a:10), the 
two are clearly not intended to be independent representatives of the public 
interest. In one of its publications on the new law, the provincial Bureau 
responsible for  local  government points out that the LMD is structured 
explicitly to prevent it from becoming a forum of opposition: "In order to 
protect the authority (kewibawaan)  of Desa Government and in order that 
this body not be used as a forum  oposisi,  the head of the aforementioned 
Lembaga Musyawarah Des  a will be the kepala desa ex-officio  .... " (Biro Bina 
1984/85:13). Furthermore, the LMD operates under the surveillance of the 
camat who is  to  attend  all  of its  deliberations  as  pengarah  - literally, 
'director' (Depdagri 1986b:41). 
Understandably, no little confusion exists at local level over the differences 
in functions of the two councils and the relation of the whole apparatus to 
the wider public it is supposed to involve.12 Theoretically, engaging public 
participation is the purpose of the LKMD. It must be consulted on the desa 
budget (APPKD) and on decisions (keputusan  desa)  related to development, 
but it has no powers. The LMD has formal powers in village government, 
but  is  not  popularly  constituted.  The  only  mention  of  direct  public 
participation in the form of village meetings (rapat  desa)  occurs in vague 
references to a role in the election of members of the LKMD (Kep Mendagri 
27 /1984) and public discussion of the proposed annual budget (Depdagri 
1986b: 39).13 
Neither the LKMD  nor the LMD  constitutes a  check on the exercise of 
authority by the kepala desa.  In contrast with the intent, structure and 
functioning of village councils which had been established spontaneously 
in many communities after the Indonesian revolution, the role envisaged 
in the legislation for  the LMD and LKMD  that replaces them can only be 
regarded as regressive. The desa council established in Desa Tarian, one of 
the villages of my research, was originally formed in the 1950s with the 
explicit objective of balancing the administrative powers of the village head 
with those of a representative decision-making body. The klian banjar and 
6 additional proportionally elected representatives from each banjar in Tarian 
formed the Dewan  Desa.  In the first years of its existence, meetings of the 
Dewan Desa rotated among banjar in order to familiarise  the population 
with its workings. Important proposals were forwarded to monthly banjar 
meetings for discussion before action was taken at desa level. In practice, the 
pivotal role of banjar assemblies in securing public involvement in local 
government and of banjar leaders as the key representatives on the desa 
council prevailed, despite many of the subsequent changes imposed on 
village administration. When the Dewan Desa was renamed the Lembaga 
Sosial Desa as a  result of the government's earliest efforts to systematise 
village councils (Keppres 81/71; Inst Mendagri 5/72), its composition and 
operations remained unchanged. 
According to Schulte Nordholt, the Democratic Party of Indonesia (PDI) 
voted  against the  provisions  of  the  1979  legislation related  to village 
councils, foreseeing that the structure and division of functions between the 
two bodies would eliminate whatever independent voice had been centred 
previously  on  the  single  village  council,  the  LSD  (1985:15).  Schulte 
Nordholt's study documents the changes in the role and function of the 
original LSD,  initially promoted by the Department of Social Affairs as  a 
mechanism  for  encouraging  autonomous  local  action  in  community 
development. The conversion of village councils into instruments of 'top-
down'  administration  began  with  the  increasing  involvement  of  the 
Department of Home Affairs in village administration after 1965.  Home 
Affairs  was much more concerned with asserting central control in the 
interests of its  administrative priorities  than the Department of Social 
Affairs had been. It increased its influence over local councils during the 
1970s  through the introduction of desa subsidies and competitions. The 
· process was sealed with the full transfer of control over desa administration 
from the Department of Social Affairs to the Ministry of Home Affairs (see 
Keppres 81/71) which now has sole authority to implement the 1979 law. 
The participation of women  - The importance of women's participation in 
national development is specifically dealt with in Home Affairs Ministerial 
Decrees concerning the new structure of desa councils and the role of the 
official women's organisation, the PKK (Pembinaan  Kesajahteraan  Keluarga  -
the  Family  Welfare  Association), in them.14 Here, once again, rhetoric and 
practice find  themselves at odds. While the preamble to the ministerial 
decree on the PKK notes the necessity for participation of "all the people" 
for the success of national development and points to the role of women 
through the PKK  as the "motivating force"  behind the development of 
society "growing from below" (Kep Mendagri 28/1984), the most striking 
feature  of  the  1984  directive  is  the  explicitly  dependent  and 
unrepresentative character of women's participation. At every level of the 
organisation from  national down to local bodies, the head of the PKK is 
specified as the wife of the relevant government official  (Kep Mendagri 
28/1984,§9-13).  The entire membership of the  village-level  PKK  Action 
Team (Tim  Penggerak), which has at its disposal a proportion of the budget 
7 for projects related to women, is appointed by the village head, the kepala 
desa/kelurahan (§16). The explicit function of local PKK units, according to 
the  government's  own  official  statements,  remains  a  passive  one  of 
transmitting government directives and promoting state ideology to the 
mass of ordinary women (Sullivan 1983:160). 
The  vision  of  women's  role  in  Indonesian  development  which  has 
characterised the PKK  from  its inception exhibits  the classic  model of 
domestication  and  dependency. It assumes  a  subordinate political  and 
economic position in the household and promotes an ideology of the family 
and women's role in it (as wife, mother, housekeeper and prime socialiser) 
which is more compatible with the state's interest in social control than 
with its stated economic objectives of expanded production and improved 
living standards.lS  Women's  participation  in  development projects  as 
conceived in policy-making circles is usually confined to those areas which 
revolve around housework and child-care  - nutrition,  health,  family 
planning, etc.  - while ignoring women's productive needs and political 
invisibility.  Hull  remarks  that  the  order  of  the  five  major  'duties' 
promulgated by the PKK  tellingly places the Indonesian woman's role as 
'citizen' last, after those of 'producer' and 'socialiser' of the nation's next 
generation, 'husband's companion', and 'household manager' (1976:21-22). 
If the activities of the PKK  serve women's interests at all, it is primarily 
those of middle-class women who benefit from bureaucratic state policy 
through  their  husbands'  positions.  Sullivan  observed  very  different 
patterns in PKK  meetings at local and district levels which she suggests 
reflect the great distance between rural needs and the bureaucratic class 
interests  that  PKK  ideology  and  practice  actually  serve.  Financial 
transactions,  informal  politicking  and  socialising  dominated  the urban 
kampong level gatherings she observed at the expense of the official part of 
the meetings which "passed quickly" and "largely unnoticed" (1983:162). At 
district level meetings, on the other hand, official PKK business dominated. 
I found Sullivan's discussion of ward meetings in the Jogjakarta kampong 
she studied typical of banjar-level PKK activities in Tarian. On the whole 
they were not well attended except when they were used to organise rotating 
credit funds (arisan). 
Although Balinese women are very active in economic affairs outside the 
home,  their  lack  of  direct  involvement  in  traditional  local  political 
organisation is notable, and there is considerable scope for improving their 
participation at banjar and desa level. The patrilineal and patrilocal social 
structure of Bali  compounded by the central government's focus  on the 
male head of household (kepala  keluarga  - kk)  in all official matters have 
the  practical  effect  of excluding  women  from  formal  involvement in 
political affairs at hamlet and village level.16 
Lack of direct voice at banjar meetings should not be construed to mean that 
women have no influence on banjar practice, of course. Informal networks 
are  an  extremely  important  part  of  decision-making  processes.  The 
8 acclaimed success of the family planning program through 'Sistim  Ban jar' 
appears less of a paradox than at first sight when the importance of family, 
work group (seka)  and other informal information networks within the 
banjar  are  taken  account  of.  Still,  as  the  heavy  stress  on  women's 
responsibilities for  contraception would indicate,  women's interests  are 
likely to be served through these structures only so long as they do not 
conflict with those of men. 
The  lack of genuine representation within the new village  government 
framework thwarts any possibility that the PKK might become a forum for 
expressing the particular concerns of village women in the public sphere or 
for  asserting women's claims with respect to local development strategies. 
The wife of the desa head, as  the one prescribed agent concerned with 
women's affairs on the village council, could not be expected to question the 
orientation of local  programs publicly.  Informal pressures are even less 
likely to be forthcoming or effective if the village is a kelurahan and the 
village head himself is not an elected, and possibly not even a local, figure. 
The  cumulative  effect  is  to  place  women  at  the  bottom  of  both  a 
bureaucratic and a gender-based hierarchy. Their purported role as 'motor 
force' under the new legislation gives them no more opportunity for taking 
initiative than they had previously,  and in some respects  less.  In Desa 
Tarian, with the reorganisation of the LKMD that followed the 1984 Decree 
of the Home Affairs Ministry, the two women who had been chosen to sit 
on the council because of their personal qualities and experience as a teacher 
and public health nurse were replaced in the new formal structure by the 
gentry wife of the village head who had no active involvement in the PKK 
previously. The comparative weakness of PKK programs in my observation 
can be attributed to both the lack of a customary foundation for separate 
women's organisations in Bali and the general irrelevance and hierarchical 
structure of the modern PKK organisation which alleges to fill this vacuum. 
The  form  of  'special  emphasis'  on  women  reflected  in  the  present 
reorganisation  of village  government,  only  exacerbates  their  political 
alienation. 
Implementation in Bali 
The establishment of a separate bureau within the office of the Governor of 
Bali,  the  Biro  Bina  Pemerintahan  Desa,  specifically  to  oversee  the 
introduction of the Village Government Law, and the production of a series 
of  publications  on  its  implementation  in  the  province  (Biro  Bina 
1984a,b,c,d;1984/85) indicate the significance which must be attached to it. 
Nevertheless, a decade after its introduction, the full impact of the 1979 Law 
has yet to be felt.17  Restructuring has been very slow and cushioned by 
informal concessions to customary practice. 
One reason for  the limited implementation of the provisions of the new 
law has been the cost of increasing the number of civil  servants on the 
9 national payroll. A letter from the Minister of Home Affairs to Provincial 
Governors  (11/1/84)  indicates  that  kepala lingkungan have  not been 
officially instated to the civil service because there is no budget to cover 
their  salaries.  For  the  same  reason,  despite  the  expectation  that 
bureaucratised kelurahan would increasingly replace administrative desa, 
no further reclassifications have taken place in Bali since 1984. Nor have the 
necessary funds been provided for  kelurahan budgets, leaving them to 
cover their own costs despite the fact that under the Village Government 
Law they have no authority to do so. The provincial government is also 
treading softly because of the recognised sensitivity of the law's provisions 
regarding local leadership. A district official charged with .introducing the 
new system, said he had avoided the disruption experienced elsewhere by 
beginning with villages that had been least politically active in the past and 
making adjustments in methods as  he moved to those that were more 
likely to put up resistance. The first stages of restructuring were introduced 
piecemeal  in  one  village  after  another,  where  possible  using  village 
competitions  (Iomba  desa)  as  the main vehicle for  putting in place the 
provisions of the legislation. In Desa Tarian klian banjar were installed as 
kepala dusun only in 1984. 
Provincial  authorities  informally  apply  'discretion'  (kebijaksanaan)  in 
implementation  procedures,  muting  the  impact  of  the  most  serious 
changes. In most cases, where desa have become kelurahan, the status of 
lurah was simply conferred upon incumbent elected officials. With respect 
to the appointment of kepala dusun as  administrative heads of banjar, 
·  kepala desa are advised by provincial authorities in Bali to consult banjar 
before nominating the requisite minimum two candidates  to  the camat. 
Effectively, the traditional election procedures continue, with the name of 
the banjar-chosen leader and one of his assistants presented to the camat in 
ranked order. The head of the Bureau established to implement the new 
law in Bali explained that this informal modification was necessary since 
"there is no doubt that a banjar official appointed without the support of the 
membership  would be completely  useless",  an  argument reiterated  by 
numerous local leaders I interviewed. 
Despite the bijaksana  policy, a number of officials admitted that there have 
been instances where camat had rejected banjar-elected  candidates and 
insisted on appointments in accord with other criteria of suitability. One 
camat stated  that he  had  several  times  failed  the  first-ranked  banjar 
candidate, on one occasion turning back both nominees and requesting a 
new slate. Above and beyond the officially prescribed test of the candidates' 
knowledge of national programmes and philosophy - Pancasila, Undang 
Undang Dasar 1945, the Broad Outline for State Policy 1983 (GBHN), and the 
Work Program of the Fourth Development Plan- his own selection criteria 
included factors such as whether the candidate had a deformity or appeared 
nervous during screening. Such personal characteristics would detract from 
the image of authority he thought appropriate to government office. 
10 The  new  legislation  gives  district  and  regional  officials  a  degree  of 
involvement in banjar affairs which had never existed before. Neither the 
camat nor the perbekel previously had a role in the selection, approval or 
installation of banjar heads. The camat cited above complained that before 
implementation of the new law, changes in banjar leadership were often 
not even reported to him. In the case of Tarian, all klian who were proposed 
by their respective banjar were in fact appointed kepala dusun. But the mere 
knowledge  that  selection  must  be  confirmed  by  higher  authorities 
inevitably introduces new considerations into the process of choosing local 
leaders. 
The  regulations  stipulate  lower  secondary  education  as  a  minimum 
qualification for appointment to the position of kepala dusun (as  well as 
village-level offices of secretary and divison heads, kepala  urusan).  Since 
only 14%  of Indonesia's adult population have been educated to this level 
(Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia 1986)18,  rigid educational requirements 
would seriously limit the potential pool of local leaders, and certainly their 
class base. Most banjar heads have only primary schooling. This is the case 
in Desa Tarian, where only two of the ten klian banjar have secondary 
qualifications.19  Although  the  clause  "or  equivalent experience"  in  the 
legislation  provides  sufficient  flexibility,  the  emphasis  on  formal 
qualifications  provides a  convenient rationale for  the rejection of some 
nominees when supra-village authorities are so inclined.20 
Bijaksana  (discretion) was also applied in the process of  restructuring desa 
councils.  Regulations  regarding  the composition and size of the LMD 
(maximum of 15) would have precluded the membership of a proportion of 
kepala dusun/banjar in large villages, leaving some banjar with no voice at 
all  on  the  LMD.  Appointive  procedures  established  by  the  law 
notwithstanding, kepala dusun  continue  to  be elected in Bali  and are 
expected by their constituencies  to represent banjar interests.  Given the 
extent of the administrative desa's dependence on component banjar for its 
operations,  the  exclusion  of  banjar  leaders  from  any  formal 
decision-making  body  at  desa  level  would  undoubtedly  cut  off 
communication and abort the one working relationship which has proved 
capable of making village  administration  effective  and  representative. 
Concern over this issue precipitated correspondence between the Governor 
of Bali and the Department of Home Affairs. In response to the Governor's 
letter indicating the problem posed by the exclusion of some banjar heads, 
however, the Department of Home Affairs directive simply reaffirmed the 
prescribed formula and obliquely advised 'selectivity' in filling the positions 
(Biro Bina 1984c: 68-79).21 
If the requirement to assure a balance among the three categories of "kepala 
dusun, leaders of local social organisations and other prominent figures" in 
the appointment of LMD  membership  had been  rigidly adhered to in 
Tarian, only half of the ten heads of dusun/banjar could theoretically have 
been included. This problem, compounded by another ministerial directive 
(Mendagri 27 /84) reducing the total number of LKMD  members who had 
11 already  been  elected  by  their  respective  banjar,  caused  considerable 
difficulties. The newest regulations precipitated lengthy discussions at a 1984 
council meeting in an effort to work out some compromise between local 
principle and official prescription. It  was finally decided that all of the klian 
banjar would remain on the LMD, taking up ten of its fifteen places. Because 
of overlapping adat and dinas roles of klian banjar in Tarian, they could 
technically qualify as appointees under either of the other two categories, 
thereby remaining within the letter of the law. Recently elected council 
members who were in excess of the now prescribed number of positions on 
the LMD were coopted informally to one of its subcommittees or to the 
LKMD. 
Modifications  to  comply  with  local  traditions  of representation  were 
rationalised once again by the judicious application of bijaksana. In practice, 
the klian banjar remain the core representative group in Tarian, handling 
village affairs at weekly meetings with the kepala desa and village secretary. 
Important matters and long-term planning are given a  public airing at 
banjar meetings and subsequently by the desa councils. There is little but 
formal distinction between LMD and LKMD  which meet as a single unit, 
although decisions are occasionally recorded as if separately concluded to 
comply with structural formalities. Since the LMD and LKMD continue to 
operate for all intents and purposes as a single village council and popularly 
chosen klian ban  jar  /kepala dusun are still fully represented, the legislation 
to date has in most respects not radically altered the internal workings of 
village administration in Tarian. 
Discretionary adjustments are rationalised on the very reasonable grounds 
that  the local  formula  for  village  representation is  simpler  and  more 
democratic than the new one.  How successful  the strategy of modified 
compliance will be depends very much on the sensitivity of intermediate 
levels of government. Discretion is of course an amorphous commodity in 
politics, and may be used to different ends depending on the balance of 
power  in  particular  situations.  For  some  officials  bijaksana  justified 
informal modifications important to insuring the continuity of what they 
also regarded as more democratic and effective local practices. In 1989 an 
official circular from the bupati of Gianyar to desa in his regency advised the 
continued practice of 5  yearly elections for  kepala dusun/ klian banjar, 
while retaining the outward form of the appointment system stipulated by 
law.  In other contexts  bijaksana  was  simply  a  temporary  instrumental 
strategy. The camat referred to above,  also remarked,  "At the moment, 
because of possible problems we are not concerned to push the letter of the 
law. This is a 'transisi'. Later we can tighten up". 
The Impact of Reorganisation- Sanur 
In many parts of Bali, discretionary practices have limited the impact of 
reorganisation on local government to date and muted the effects of the 
central  government's  bureaucratisation  policies.  Such  accommodation 
12 proved short-lived, however,  in  the village of Sanur which was more 
acutely affected than most villages because it experienced both sub-division 
and 'upgrading' to kelurahan status. The case of Desa Sanur is particularly 
interesting since this village represents something of a model example of 
self-help  community  development,  having  initiated  an  extraordinary 
program of local public investment in the late 1960s. Over several decades 
Sanur's leaders built up an impressive range of village owned industries 
including a  bank,  several  restaurants  and a  motor repair shop which 
eventually employed several hundred villagers and subsidised educational, 
health and other public facilities in the desa. 
Since the colonial period Desa Sanur had been a single adminstrative unit. 
With  the introduction of the Village  Government  Law  in  1979,  it was 
divided into  three separate  administrative  villages,  one of which  was 
officially designated a kelurahan, while the other two became independent 
desa.  This  administrative sub-division appears not to have changed the 
practical functioning of Sanur's development program in the first  years 
following promulgation of the new law. The status quo prevailed largely 
because the village head since 1959, and one of the pioneers of the desa's self-
help projects, Ida Bagus Beratha, became the head of the new kelurahan of 
Sanur in line with the provincial policy of discretionary appointment of 
incumbents. Beratha was able to keep intact the organisational structure 
Sanur had established for managing its affairs until his death in 1986. 
Several aspects of the restructuring and "loss of control over its own affairs" 
as  a  kelurahan  posed  serious  problems  for  the  village  development 
program which Sanur had built up over two decades. First of all, kelurahan 
no longer being autonomous villages lose their fiscal independence. They 
are meant primarily to administer development projects as  directed from 
higher  levels  of government.  The  complicated  question of whether  a 
non-autonomous  village  could or could not 'own'  an enterprise in the 
name of its members is circumvented to some extent in Sanur's case by the 
existence  of  the  registered  Desa  Development  Foundation  (Yayasan), 
operating under the direction of the desa council, which acts as the holding 
body for commonly owned village industries. Opinions among provincial 
and regional officials differed on whether the loss of fiscal  independence 
would technically preclude such village based enterprises. Beratha believed 
that under  the present circumstances  it would  have been  much more 
difficult for Sanur to get its development program off the ground. The Head 
of  the  Biro  Bina  Pemerintahan  Desa  agreed  that  what  Sanur  had 
undertaken in the 1960s would theoretically be outside its jurisdiction as a 
kelurahan, since among other things, it has lost its right to raise public 
funds. But because to date no subsidies for the administration of kelurahan 
have  been  forthcoming,  the  Bureau  necessarily  turns  a  blind  eye  to 
fund-raising by kelurahan. 
Secondly, when the core village of Sanur became a kelurahan, its members 
lost the right to elect all local officials. Beratha, as previously elected head of 
the desa, had simply been appointed kepala kelurahan when the law was 
13 put into effect  in Sanur.  What happened following  his  death in  1986, 
however, gives some indication that the 'bijaksana'  policy of discretionary 
concession to public opinion will give way over time to increasingly more 
direct exercise of control by upper levels of the bureaucracy. During the 
following year the Sanur village council proposed a  string of nominees, 
who were one after  another rejected  by provincial  authorities  without 
explanation. A local leader and early collaborator in establishing the village 
projects commented: 
According to the law the kepala kelurahan is appointed from above. But 
there should be discretion  . ...  Because a principle of development is that 
it must be by and for the people  .... Don't go giving something to people 
that they don't want. That isn't good and conflicts with religious law. 
We made overtures both formally and informally. We had to provide 
reasons for every name we put up, but from the government we never 
received a reason for their rejections. (recorded interview 1987) 
In April 1987 a naval officer who had spent the last ten years away from his 
home village on assignment in Java, was seconded from the armed forces 
and appointed to fill the position left vacant by Beratha's death.22 
Finally,  restructuring  threatens  to  undermine  the  successful  working 
relationship between the banjar and village level administration in Sanur 
which had developed over two decades. Sanur had founded its own Desa 
Council in 1963.  The later introduction of Lembaga  Sosial  Desa  (LSD)  as 
village  councils  in  1973  (lnst  Mendagri  5/72)  throughout  Indonesia 
involved no serious adjustments, "having no more effect than a change of 
name" (Sanur LKMD  1982:2).  But later changes were to alter significantly 
the machinery Sanur had established for managing its industries and its 
capacity to maintain some degree of public control over local development. 
Elected banjar and desa officials had played key roles in building public 
confidence and getting Sanur's village-owned industries off the ground. 
The desa council (BPD, later LSD, now LKMD),  comprised mainly of klian 
dinas representing  each  banjar, had served as guardians of the public 
interest. 
Like  Tarian,  Sanur  attempted  to  retain  a  more  broadly  based  and 
representative composition on its  Desa Council.  For  several years after 
subdivision  into  three  villages,  a  single  council  continued  to  operate 
covering the three administrative desa and including all banjar heads.~ In 
its report, published by the provincial government's Directorate of Village 
Development for emulation by other villages, Sanur noted that it had not 
fully succeeded in accommodating ministerial directives with respect to the 
desa  council:  "The  organisational  structure of  the LKMD  Sanur is  not 
precisely the same as  that stipulated in Keputusan Menteri Dalam Negeri 
No. 225  Tahun 1980, but differs somewhat according to the history of its 
local institutions" (Sanur 1982:13,30). 
14 As  well  as  the division  which  took  place at village  level,  fifteen  new 
geographically  rationalised  subvillage  units  (dusun  in  the  two  desa, 
lingkungan in the kelurahan) were supposed to replace the twenty-four 
banjar dinas which had corresponded to the traditional banjar adat. This 
caused considerable resistance because, as Beratha said, "these ties are so 
deeply connected to traditional beliefs" (recorded interview 1984). The loss of the 
banjar as  the base to Sanur's administrative structure would cripple it. 
Public  confidence  rested  on  its  role  in  vetting  the  distribution  of 
employment opportunities and of budgetary allocations. "We had to register 
a protest, because with Keputusan [Mendagri] Number 17, 1984 we saw that 
there was no klian [banjar] dinas. Without the klian dinas there would be 
nobody to  examine records,  no  advisory group"  (recorded interview 1984). 
Restructured lingkungan existed only on paper until Beratha's death, when 
Sanur  began  to  experience  gre!iter  pressure  to  put into  effect  a  full 
reorganisation.  Reflecting  continued resistance,  another  village  leader 
remarked, 
The  implementation  of  this  regulation  is  not  yet  100%,  not  even 
50% ... There  has  yet to be cooperation.  Excuse me if I  speak rather 
negatively, I  think there must be negotiation  ... .! was on one occasion 
interrogated  by  a  government  official,  'Why  had  we  postponed 
establishing the lingkungan boundaries?'  'Yes,  of course,'  I  said, 'but 
how is it to be done?  It's easy enough to play at putting lines on a piece 
of paper!'  (recorded interview 1987) 
The future of the village industries and the direction of local development 
in Sanur, matters of deep concern in that community, depend ultimately 
upon the character of local leadership and the level of public involvement 
it is able to maintain. These experiences of local government 'reform' in a 
village  regarded  by  provincial  authorities  as  a  model  for  self-help 
development  initiatives  do  not  augur  well  for  the  direction  in  which 
bureaucratisation policies will take other communities in Bali. 
Misplaced Priorities 
The 1979 Village Government Law is predicated on the assumption that the 
desa is the basic unit of local government, whereas in Bali the level of local 
organisation  which  involves  direct  public participation  is  in  fact  the 
banjar.24  Village  government and development programs in both Tarian 
and Sanur depended on component banjar  for  their effectiveness.  The 
cooption of banjar leadership is in practical terms most serious because the 
banjar does approximate a  natural community and because there is no 
established convention of choosing leaders from the traditional elite as is 
frequently the case at desa leve1.25 
Although  informal  discretionary  concessions  to  customary  practice 
continue to prevail, banjar are inevitably constrained to take account of 
official  policies  regarding  formal  qualifications  of age,  education  and 
15 political orientation at the expense of ideal notions of banjar leadership 
which place much greater emphasis on personal qualities of honesty and 
disposition to public service .~ Furthermore, banjar are no longer at liberty 
to replace unsatisfactory leadership at will. District and provincial officals 
tended to see turn-over in banjar leadership as petty and improvident. In 
the opinion of the head of the Biro Bina Pemerintahan Desa the indefinite 
term of office still left room for removal when a banjar head did not fulfill 
stipulated conditions,  "but the reason  has to be investigated from  the 
bupati's office to be certain it is not merely a personal squabble. They can't 
just change klian whenever they feel like it anymore, or dump one because 
they simply don't like him. There has to be order in administration - and· it 
is  not very orderly if there  is  constant  turn-over in leadership".27  In 
conventional practice, however, testing leadership qualities is necessarily a 
matter of trial and error and the capacity to replace klian in the face of public 
disaffection is a crucial part of the diffuse forms of popular control which 
operate at hamlet level. 
An incident  which  occurred  in one  banjar  not  long  after  the  official 
installation of kepala dusun there illustrates the extent to which the new 
'formalities' had begun to influence local political process. On that occasion 
moves were made by the membership of one dusun/banjar to dismiss their 
recently  installed  head  as  a  result  of  accusations  that  he  had 
misappropriated a government-granted water pump. At the meeting banjar 
members challenged his misuse of public office, but were persuaded that 
control over the position was no longer technically in their hands and that a 
request for dismissal to district level was unlikely to be well received since 
his appointment had been made official only a few months before. Other 
banjar leaders resigned in veiled protest, but the klian was in the end only 
reprimanded after making a  formal  apology to the banjar membership. 
Interestingly, in his defense the offending banjar head argued that as kepala 
dusun he believed he was responsible only to the government department 
concerned in administering such grants and therefore had not been obliged 
to consult the banjar assembly.28 
The outcome of the case is an indication of the longer term consequences of 
the cooption of banjar leadership. Appointment by superordinate officials 
will  subvert  leaders'  perceptions  of  their  obligations  toward  their 
constituencies and erode popular support and involvement in decision-
making. The conversion of desa to kelurahan, and therefore of all village 
and hamlet-level leaders to civil servant status, is  all  the more cause for 
concern. As  well  as  the substitution of appointment for  election (which 
effectively returns desa administration to the colonial situation) and the 
security  of tenure  of  civil  service  positions,  the  option  of  installing 
non-local officials  as  village or hamlet heads29  will  eliminate even  the 
indirect social pressures which communities may exert over officials of local 
origin. Since the banjar is the only level of government in Bali which can be 
said to involve direct public participation, the consequences of ignoring its 
rights to control over local  leaders are self-evident.  The Dutch scholar-
administrator  V.E.  Korn's  remarks  on  the  consequences  of  installing 
16 appointed  functionaries  in  the  colonial  reorganisation  of  village 
government in Bali  during the early part of this century are not without 
relevance to the extension of bureaucratisation policies more than a  half 
century later: 
It is clear that the independence of the village and banjar administration 
initially would have received a telling blow. Because what remains after 
all of the right of the people to be under their own heads, when these are 
arbitrarily replaced by people with whom one would not ordinarily have 
any dealing?  ... Perbekel who replaced bendesa were regarded in the 
villages as cronies of the government, who did not belong to the village 
institutions...  (1924:229-330). 
The more recent addition by ministerial decree (Kep Mendagri 7 /1983) of 
sub-dusun units,  Rukun  Warga  (RW)  and Rukun  Tetangga  (RT),30  with 
locally elected leaders may have been intended to ameliorate the effects of 
the original legislation on grass-roots organisation. But it does so only by 
further  elongating  and  complicating  the  channels  of  communication 
between village and state. There are now seven levels of administration 
below that of central government (see  Figure 1).  The adjustment leaves 
popular participation too far down the chain to enable active involvement 
in  the  political  process,  with  communication  cut  off  by  appointed 
intermediaries at dusun/banjar level. 
· Offical Images and Local Competencies 
While reiterating the importance of decentralisation and of encouraging the 
goals of self-help and participation expressed in the Guidelines for State 
Policy  (GBHN  1983,1988),  central  government  policies  in  Indonesia 
continue  to  reflect  paternalistic  and  condescending  attitudes  toward 
village-level organisation and leadership common among urban elites. A 
Department of Home Affairs  paper on rural development in Indonesia 
complains  of  "the  scarcity  of  dynamic,  creative  and  fair  leadership, 
inefficient coordination of development, low level quality and quantity of 
village  administrative  machinery,  lack  of  capability  to  plan,  weak 
implementation" (1981:65) which hinder its programs. 
The Village  Government Law and subsequent regulations  were framed 
with the intent of more efficient direction of local government from the 
center. Insofar as decentralisation and regionalisation of local development 
planning have occurred, they are aimed at levels of bureaucracy beyond the 
village, and within the purview of direct central control. The Department of 
Home  Affairs'  focus  on  a  kecamatan-based  management  system  "to 
maintain the concept of unity of command" (1981:65)  is indicative of.  the 
limits of decentralisation and participation actually envisaged. 
Decentralisation in Indonesia  has  not involved  genuine  devolution of 
authority which as  Uphoff et a1.(1979)  argue must be closely tied to an 
17 elective as opposed to a bureaucratic locus of power if it is to be effective and 
responsible. "[F]or increasing popular participation, devolution of authority, 
giving lower echelon elected officials greater power, is more promising than 
administrative  deconcentration.  Compared  to  bureaucrats,  elected 
decision-makers at the regional, district, or sub-district level are much more 
accessible  and more easily held accountable for  the choices  that affect 
people's lives" (1979:69). 
What  deconcentration  has  taken  place  in the  form  of regionalisation 
policies, it has been paralleled at the same time by a  gradual transfer of 
power from desa to kecamatan. This has been government policy since the 
founding of the New Order (see Tjondronegoro 1984:89-90).  The Home 
Affairs Ministry favoured kecamatan focused 'decentralisation' because of 
the convenience  of larger,  more uniform  administrative  units  and the 
advantage of dealing with camat, who by virtue of their education and civil 
servant status were regarded as less inclined to "cling to tradition" than 
village headmen. Camat tend to be recruited from urban areas and their 
authority  is  grounded  in  the  bureaucracy.  Officials  with  a  cultural 
background and structural position so firmly  attached  to  the center, as 
Tjondronegoro  (1984:132-33)  has pointed out, could not be expected  to 
represent or defend village interests within the administrative hierarchy. 
Despite lip-service to the principle of wider representation of the public in 
village  administration,  the  new  legislation  actually  formalises  the 
centralisation of authority in the hands of the kepala desa and supra-village 
officials- the camat and bupati- to whom he is in turn responsible.31  Under 
the legislation  the village secretary, all  administrative assistants, kepala 
dusun and members of the LMD are nominated or appointed directly by the 
kepala desa (UU  5/1979; Mendagri 8/1981). Predictably these powers of 
appointment  invite  abuse.  A  letter  to  provincial  governors  from  the 
Department of Home Affairs indicates that the stipulation that appointees 
be "able to cooperate with the kepala desa" was mistakenly being interpreted 
to encourage nepotism. A subsequent directive consequently prohibits the 
appointment to these positions of any members of the immediate family of 
the kepala desa (Biro  Bina  1984d:118ff).  This, of course, does nothing to 
change the likelihood that vertical linkages of other sorts could enable the 
total domination of village government by this single elected official. 
Not surprisingly, given their composition and marginality, the two desa 
councils  were  not  found  to  be  taking  the  'dynamic'  role  in  rural 
development envisaged by central government. A manual on the LMD was 
issued in 1986 because it had become apparent that this council "was not yet 
functioning  as  intended  ... to  realise  Pancasila  Democracy".  It expresses 
particular concern that kepala desa were frequently enacting their own 
decisions  without first  consulting  the LMD  (Depdagri  1986a:4,29).  The 
unexamined assertion that the source of these failures  lay in the "very 
limited  capabilities"  of local  authorities,32  underscores  the patronising 
paternalism at the heart of many aspects of the legislation.  The Manual 
notes the "limited level of knowledge" and "limited capability of members 
18 of the LMD to take in, understand and carry out decisions based on UU #5 
1979" (Depdagri 1986a:5). No cognisance is taken of the extent to which these 
problems arise from basic contradictions in the legislation and ministerial 
directives themselves. 
The lack of checks and balances within the local government system was the 
subject of incisive comments by the previous head of the village of Sanur: 
What is funny about the LMD as a  deliberating body under Undang 
Undang Number 5, I notice, is that its head is the kepala desa. So who is 
going to exercise control? In my opinion it is clumsy. The secretary to the 
LMD is also the secretary to the kepala desa - so he is going to oversee his 
own work! And LMD members aren't likely to take issue with anything 
when the head of the LMD is the kepala desa himself. As village head, is 
it possible I will be able to criticise myself?  (recorded interview 1984) 
Dealing with constant changes in regulations regarding local government 
structures is  regarded everywhere as disruptive and wasteful.  A  new 
apparatus has barely the opportunity to start functioning before it is revised, 
reorganised or replaced. A local leader in Tarian remarked, 
Everytime there is a new minister everything has to be changed for no 
better reason than to show that he has authority (berwenang).  When 
there's a new Education Minister, the children have to buy a new colour 
uniform  ... when  there's  a  new  Home  Affairs  Minister  the  village 
councils get reorganised. How are we supposed to be making progress 
when we are always having to revamp what was just starting to work? 
(recorded interview 1984) 
Widespread complaints in Tarian about the debilitating effects of continual 
changes  in  government  legislation  and  programming  were echoed  in 
Sanur. "Before any new plan can be put into action, it has already changed; 
just as a work plan is prepared, it is cut off" (recorded interview 1984). 
While the importance of communication and participation as prerequisites 
for any kind of effective and equitable rural development policy has become 
a  truism  of  government  and  academic  discourse  (Uphoff  et  a1.1979; 
Hainsworth 1982;  GBHN 1983;  Gow and VanSant 1983;  Hendrata 1983; 
Esman and Uphoff 1984;  Mubyarto  1984;  Rondinelli  et al.  1989),  both 
political  and economic  strategies  for  Indonesian  development  remain 
centralised and hierarchical.  From the central government's perspective, 
village autonomy and popular participation are conceived  in  terms of 
economic self-support and local contribution to state programs, not public 
inclusion in decision-making. The notion of village 'autonomy' inferred in 
the expression "conduct its own affairs" in the 1979 Law is explicated in the 
Home Affairs  Department manual on village  government only as  "the 
ability to cover the costs of routine and development activities as well as 
public services" (1986b:2). 
19 In the Balinese case, established local systems already provided the basis for 
information exchange, for pooling and managing common funds and for 
high levels of routinised participation and accountability. To a remarkable 
degree the mechanisms institutionalised in the obligations and conventions 
of banjar organisation have been extended to incorporate new economic 
and social initiatives. Put in economically 'rational'  terms, the customary 
basis of local institutions effectively subsidises the organisational costs of 
carrying out the development programs of the state.  For this pragmatic 
reason, at least, the state ought to  take local institutions for  cooperative 
action seriously (Wade 1988:217; Rondinelli et al. 1989: 69ff). 
Indeed,  cost-saving is  the  one sense  in  which  the  rhetoric  of  public 
participation has real meaning in Indonesian government circles (Depdagri 
1986b:2).  But  here  New Order  policy  is  at  odds  with  itself,  for  the 
organisational energies  of local  systems  cannot be harnessed effectively 
without a political stake in the process. In this regard, the relationship of the 
Indonesian state to what it regards as local instrumentalities is  a crucial 
issue. Comparative studies suggest that the imposition of externally created 
structures has been a  common factor in the failure of rural development 
initiatives  (Anderson  1982;  Gow  and  Vansant  1983:428;  Gondolf  1988; 
Esman and Uphoff 1984). 
A corraborative indication of the deleterious effects of bureaucratisation on 
local institutions in Bali  comes from an intensive study of two irrigation 
associations (subak)  sponsored by the Ford Foundation and conducted by 
staff at Udayana University (Sutawan et al.1984). One of the two subak had 
experienced  a  very  long  period  of  government  involvement  which 
originated with the construction of permanent irrigation canals in 1941 
under  the  Dutch  and  its  subsequent  integration  into  the  irrigation 
programme of the Public Works Department (P.U.).  The other subak has 
operated entirely independently of government involvement.  The study 
found a  poor level of maintenance and repair in the P.U.  subak (which 
remained responsible for the secondary irrigation channels, while the Public 
Works  Department  had  responsibility  for  the  primary  system)  by 
comparison with that of the non-P.U.  subak.  The  authors attribute  the 
degree of apathy in the subak which is partially managed by the Public 
Works Department to the low level of members' involvement in planning 
the government's part of the program, which had resulted in technical 
changes incompatible with the system of water division preferred by most 
subak members (1984:257-58),  and to related authoritarian and nepotistic 
leadership arrangements in the P.U. subak.33 
Conclusion 
The  1979  Village  Government  Law  involves  more  than  a  rational 
reorganisation of local  government.  It institutionalises  a  hierarchically 
oriented  administrative  structure  which,  contrary  to  its  proclaimed 
20 objective  of  increasing  participation,  will  exacerbate  the  lack  of 
communication  between  central  government  and  the  Indonesian 
population. In the process, it threatens to undercut long-evolved and highly 
effective mechanisms for  community cooperation which already exist in 
different forms throughout Indonesia. 
Not the least telling  paradox is  that  the kelurahan pattern of village 
reorganisation  under  the Village  Government Law  is  premised on an 
assumed  disappearance  of  cooperative  gotong  royong  traditions,  still 
officially touted as fundamental to the Indonesian national character and 
philosophy (GBHN 1983,1988;  Depdagri 1986b:2).  Development policy is 
predicated on the assumption, even promotion, of a decline in the political 
and economic autonomy of communities as they move through specified 
stages  of  development  from  traditional  swadaya  (self-help)  through 
transitional  swakarya  (self-activating)  to  modern  swasembada  (self-
sustaining) villages. The disjuncture between appeals to the involvement of 
collective subjects implicit in the language of these classifications and the 
actual loss of local power to central authority as villages are guided through 
each of these 'progressive' stages couldn't be more stark, and is another 
example of the ideological 'misrecognition' intended in the state's use of 
populist discourse (see Bowen 1986; Van Langenberg 1986; Warren 1989). 
Tjondronegoro cites  a  Home Affairs Ministry paper which defines these 
three developmental stages in revealing terms.  In government planning 
traditional swadaya  desa with strong primary group relationships and self-
sustaining orientations are to give way to swakarya  desa where "customary 
and traditional law is in transition and external influences have penetrated, 
making  for  changes  in  the  way  of  thinking  ...  and  gotong  royong  is 
decreasing." Swasembada  villages  are described as  "free  from  stringent, 
limitative,  traditional  laws;  there  are  rational  relationships  between 
villagers  ...  and a clear institutional framework" (1984:90-91). The aspiration 
of the Home Affairs Ministry is  to have all 60,000  villages in Indonesia 
achieve  swasembada  status  by  the  first  decade  of  the  21st  century 
(Department of Home Affairs et al.1981:64). Since a decline in the spirit of 
gotong royong is one basis for converting desa to kelurahan and for  the 
thoroughgoing transfer of authority to  central bureaucratic management, 
this  is presumably the ideal form  that "a  clear institutional framework" 
would take (See Mendagri 2/84). 
Historically, state and market penetration have operated to undermine local 
organisational structures which make  cooperative  action possible, more 
often than not without establishing workable alternatives (See  Lipton 1985; 
Uphoff 1987a:218; Uphoff 1987b:42;  Dove 1988:22ff; Wade 1988:216). In this 
regard, Wade argues, "a  malfunctioning approximation  to a  formalised 
system of state control... based on a  distant authority only dimly aware of 
local conditions, may be worse ... than a strategy which aims to improve, or 
at least not impair local systems" (1986:105). Lipton makes a similar case for 
the strengths of localised decision-making (1985:101). And Rondinelli et al. 
point  to  growing  evidence  that  "local  services  can  be  performed  by 
21 community associations more efficiently than by an overburdened central 
government" (1989:73). 
But there is little evidence of the respect for local competencies in Third 
World  government  circles  that  a  genuinely  collaborative  approach  to 
community development would require.34  This is not only because of the 
advantages (which are decidedly short-term) of direct social control to power 
elites,  but also  because of the great cultural  disjunction  between  the 
paternalist values of these urban elites and the practical concerns and local 
knowledges of rural people (Anderson 1982;  Dove 1985;1988).  If, as these 
writers conclude, the possibility of genuine community development rests 
heavily on striking a balance between local and central government roles in 
political  and economic processes  (Gondolf 1988:156;  Gow and Vansant 
1983:430; Esman and Uphoff 1984), radically different approaches from the 
Indonesian state will be needed. Taking its own rhetorical position on local 
participation  seriously,  genuine  reform  would  necessarily  begin  by 
redressing the undemocratic and authoritarian features of the 1979 Village 
Government Law. 
22 1.  The following short forms will be used to refer to the sources of related regulations and 
documents: Keppres - Keputusan Presiden; Instr  I Kep Mendagri - Instruksi/ Keputusan Menteri 
Dalam Negeri; Depdagri - Departemen Dalam Negeri; Biro  Bina - Biro  Bina Pemerintahan 
Desa; Perda I - Peraturan Daerah Propinsi Daerah Tingkat I;  Perda II  - Peraturan Daerah 
Kabupaten Daerah Tingkat IT. For complete references see the Government Documents section of 
the Bibliography. Between 1979 and 1986 thirty-five regulations, decrees and instructions were 
issued by the Home Affairs Ministry concerned with implementing the Village Government Law. 
Only the most important are listed here. 
2. See Warren (1986) for a discussion of the role of the banjar in community development and the 
implementation of Indonesian development policy. On the analogous role of Balinese irrigation 
associations (subak), see Suasta (1988) and Sutawan et al (1984). 
3. A more recent statement from a Department of Home Affairs Manual on village government 
reiterates the point: "  ... [T]he consequence of various forms and styles of desa government, each 
possessing its own unique characteristics, is a  frequent hindrance, within  the  framework  of 
intensive guidance and control,  to efforts to increase the standard of living and effective conduct 
of government" (Depdagri 1986b:2-3, my emphasis). 
4. In Java bengkok  lands associated with village office formed  the basis of deeply entrenched 
patronage arrangements. 
5.  The single candidate/empty ballot box (kotak  kosong) alternative is widely adopted in Bali 
because of a distaste for overt competition for local office. It is not unusual, however, for the 
anonymous box to win. See, for example, the letter to the editor of the Bali  Post. "Keluhan 
Terhadap  Nasib  Desa  Kami"  (3/12/84). 
6.  The camat along with representatives of police and military comprise the official Supervisory 
Committee for the election of the kepala desa. They coordinate and give advice to the Electoral 
and Nominating Committee and scrutinise nominees (Mendagri 6/1981, §5). On advice from the 
camat, the bupati must approve all nominations to the office of kepala desa. Keeler (1985:118) 
mentions complaints in Central Java  of manipulation of  the screening tests to  eliminate 
significant competition in elections. See also N. Schulte-Nordholt (1982:123) on the influence of 
supra-desa authorities on the election process via the screening committees. 
7.  Indicatively, the Indonesian word dusun has pejorative connotations of backward rusticity. 
Undoubtedly reflecting more serious concern over the political effects of the 1979 law on local 
institutions, the Governor of Bali declared in 1983 that the name banjar should not after all be 
displaced under the new system and that 'dusun/banjar' would henceforth become the standard 
designation of hamlet units in his province (Letter from the Governor of Bali  to Heads of 
Kabupaten, 5/9/83). This symbolic gesture did not touch the structural consequences of the 
legislation,  however.  Provincial  and  regional  implementing legislation  present  verbatim 
restatements of the national law and there was a decided anxiety among intermediate officials 
in Bali to avoid overt conflict with central government. 
8. Although the administrative (dinas) and customary (adat) units of local organisation at desa 
and banjar level are theoretically distinct, this is not the case in practise. The separation of adat 
and  dinas  affairs  in  colonial  policy  had  considerable  effect  at desa  level  where  the 
administrative unit rarely today coincides with that of the desa adat. Even so, considerable 
coordination and interaction among adat and dinas leaders within the desa is necessary since so 
many aspects of civic life in Bali impinge on both spheres. At banjar level the dinas unit remains 
so thoroughly dependent on the banjar adat that the two domains are difficult to distinguish, and 
in some parts of Bali, including the entire Gianyar region, klian banjar adat automatically acted 
as klian dinas, even in cases where they did not receive formal recognition from higher levels of 
government for the administrative functions they performed. 
23 9. "Kelurahan  adalah  suatu  wilayah ... yang  tidak  berhak  menyelenggarakan  rumah  tangganya 
sendiri" (UU 5/1979, §1). 
10. Lingkungan  parallel the dusun  as subunits of kelurahan and desa  respectively in the new 
scheme (see Figure 1).  Both replace the banjar dinas in Bali.  But while dusun within desa 
continue to coincide with the old banjar dinas, and therefore in most cases also with the banjar 
adat, this was not intended to remain the case with lingkungan established under the kelurahan. 
Attempts were made at  rationalisation  of lingkungan boundaries along geographic  and 
demographic lines with little apparent success  to date. See below for a  discussion of the 
difficulties which the village of Sanur has experienced as a consequence of these changes. 
11." ...  mewadahi  perwujudan  pelaksanaan  Demokrasi  Pancasila  dalam  pemerintahan  Desa."  -
literally, to "embody the realisation and implementation of Pancasila Democracy in Village 
government" (Depdagri 1986a:7). 
12. This is acknowledged in a letter from the Minister of Home Affairs to Provincial Governors, 5 
November 1981 and in the subsequently published manuals regarding the functioning of the LMD 
(Depdagri 1986a;1986b). 
13. Desa meetings are unrealistic in Bali because of the size of administrative villages which 
typically include over a  thousand households. Nor are there public meeting places on a desa-
wide scale equivalent to the customary banjar meeting hall. Most villages to my knowledge have 
never held meetings of the entire membership of the administrative desa. The business of 
soliciting popular opinion on village administrative matters has since independence been 
handled at the monthly meetings of component banjar. 
14. See Mendagri 28/80; 225/80; 4/82; 27 /84; 28/84. Figure 2  shows the relationship of the PKK to 
the overall organisational structure of the LKMD. 
15. See Staudt (1986)  for a  theoretical discussion of the role of the state and bureaucracy in 
institutionalising and reinforcing male privilege.  She argues that there is an entrenched 
bureaucratic resistance to women's participation arising out of the redistributive threats that 
comprehensive development programs would pose (1986:329). 
16. Membership in the banjar council is customarily as a pair (banjar luh/banjar muani ; but the 
male partner as lineal descendent through the patri-line, inheriting the houseyard (karang 
ayahan) and associated civic responsibilities is the usual public representative of the married 
couple. Technically under Balinese adat, a woman becomes the recognised head of household if, 
for  lack of a  male descendent, she becomes the 'substitute heir'(sentana).  The in-marrying 
husband is then considered the juridical female. In this case, a  woman theoretically should 
represent the household at banjar assemblies and in public labour service. In some villages this is 
customary practice.  Hobart reports that one woman in the village of his research had a 
reputation as an influential orator (1979:579).  Generally, however, women claim  they are 
embarrassed and prefer to send a male representative in their place. In the case of widows who 
have no adult sons to perform these services, customary legal codes (awig-awig)  usually provide 
special dispensation (tapakan)  from ban  jar  I desa service. 
17. A 1983-84 study commissioned by the Department of Education and Culture to document 
leadership systems in village Bali makes no reference to the 1979 law in its discussion of dinas 
officials, nor does it  use the term 'dusun' in place of banjar (Swarsi et al. 1986). 
18. See also Bali Post 7/11/84, "80 Persen Penduduk Indonesia Berpendidikan Rendah". 
19. I should stress that there was no apparent correlation between level of formal education and 
generally acknowledged competence among the local leaders I studied. In fact, some of the most 
active and efficient did not possess secondary school qualifications. Among these was the village 
24 head of Sanur who was instrumental in establishing an innovative development program based on 
village-owned industries, and who possessed exceptional leadership qualities by any standard. 
See below for a discussion of the particular effects of government policy on local leadership in 
that  village. 
20. Such incidents are apparently still rare or unpopular enough to warrant reporting in the Bali 
Post. See "Camat  Tegallalang  tidak  akui  Darsana  Kepala  Dusun  Pakudui"  (27  I 4/89)  which 
reports a  recent instance in which the elected kepala dusun/banjar who had already been 
carrying out the duties for office for two months was refused formal appointment by the camat of 
Tegallalang on the grounds that he lacked a primary school certificate. I concur with Dove's 
expression of concern (1988:7f0 at the over-valuation of formal education in both Indonesian and 
international development policy circles. As formal education conventionally operates, it often 
has the effect of cutting short children's informal schooling in the local knowledge system and of 
devaluing the place of that knowledge system in the global one. 
21. "Mengenai  kesulitan  yang  dihadapi  dalam  rangka  menentukan  jumlah  anggota  LMD  karena 
jumlah  dusunnya  terlalu  banyak,  kiranya  dapat  dilaksanakan  penentuan  anggotanya  secara 
selektif  dan  memperhatikan  keseimbangan  jumlah  anggota  Lembaga  Musyawarah  Desa  dari 
perangkat  desa,  pimpinan  lembaga  masyarakat  dan  pemuka-pemuka  masyarakat."  Letter  from 
the Minister of Home Affairs to the Governor of Bali  11/11/1983 in Biro Bina 1984c: 68-79. 
22. Throughout the New Order period there has been increasing involvement of the military in 
local  affairs.  Members  of  the  armed  forces  are  now  routinely  attached  to  district-level 
bureaucracies across the country. Every kecamatan has a 'trouble-shooting' task force (TRIPIDA) 
comprised of the camat and representatives of the armed forces and police. Retired or seconded 
ABRI members appear to have been heavily favoured in appointments to newly bureaucratised 
local government positions. The current Home Affairs Minister, fortunately, appears to be 
committed to reversing aspects of this policy and 1989  regulations require that henceforth 
civilians be appointed at regional government level and below. 
23. In some banjar in Sanur the positions of klian adat and dinas were separate. In others, as in 
Desa Tarian, one person acted as both customary and official banjar head. 
24. Prijono and Prijono (1983) and Tjondronegoro (1984) make the point that sub-desa units are the 
primary locus of strong community ties and collective action in contemporary Java as well.  "  ...  [A]t 
this level, elements of 'primitive democracy' and mutual-help practices are still functioning 
effectively" (Tjondronegoro 1984:236). 
Numerous observers of local government in Java have commented on tensions between desa 
leaders'  representative and  administrative  roles  (Zacharias  1979;  Schulte Nordholt '1982; 
Tjonderonegoro 1984; Keeler 1985:127). These tensions also press heavily on village officials in 
Bali,  but close social  interaction, elective practices, and the power of formal  and informal 
sanctions maintained some sense of control over leadership in local communities. While popular 
control applied more directly at banjar than at desa level, the fact that desa were for practical 
purposes dependent on constituent banjar meant that village government on the whole could not 
afford  to  ignore  popular  sentiments.  See  also  N.C.  Schulte-Nordholt  (1985:7)  on  the 
representative character of the Rukun Tetangga leadership in Java and their role in insuring 
expression of popular interest within the LSD. 
25. In a study of economic development in the rural Philippines, Anderson found that it was "the 
overwhelming continuity of established power and wealth that dictated most of the adverse 
consequences of rapid rural development there" (1982:164). These forces have been ameliorated to 
a much greater extent in Balinese communities by the counterbalancing importance of banjar 
leaders who do not normally represent such established interests and whose primary orientation 
has been to their consituencies. 
25 26. Similar observations were made by William Cole on the impact of new procedures on the 
selection of banjar heads in the Karangasem and Gianyar areas where he was working (personal 
communication 1984). 
27. There is no little inconsistency in the views held by intermediate bureaucrats. The positive 
convictions expressed in the same interviews about the power of the banjar relative to that of 
central government and the importance of acceding to popular electoral conventions undoubtedly 
reflect their own ambivalent positions as agents of the state, but banjar members themselves with 
strong ties to their own communities. 
28.  Although not immediately removed from office, innuendo in the banjar continued and the 
kepala dusun /klian banjar concerned did eventually resign. 
29. Although standard practice has been to  appoint these officials from within their own 
locality, I was told of a number of instances where heads of kelurahan were in fact appointed 
from elsewhere. The objective of assuring that primary loyalty be directed to superiors will 
doubtless result in an increasing number of appointments circulating from within the bureaucracy 
as occurs at kecamatan level. 
30.  See §1  of the decree defining the structure and purpose of these two levels: "RT and  R W 
adalah  organisasi  masyarakat  yang  diakui  dan  dibina  oleh  Pemerintah  untuk  memelihara  dan 
melestariakan  nilai-nilai  kehidupan  masyarakat  Indonesia  yang  berdasarkan 
kegotong-royongan  dan  kekeluargaan  serta  untuk  membantu  meningkatkan  kelancaran 
pelaksanaan  tugas  pemerintahan,  pembangunan  dan  kemasyarakatan ...  " (Kep Mendagri 7  /1983). 
RT were originally created in Java during the Japanese occupation and remain as local units of 
village organisation there (Tjondronegoro 1984; Schulte Nordholt 1985). I was told by the head of 
the regional Bureau of Government that it was unlikely that RT and RW would be established in 
Bali since tempeken, as formal subdivisions of the banjar already fulfilled this function. 
31. Desa "control over its own affairs" is in any case strictly limited. As we have seen, district 
and  regional  authorities  vet  the selection  of  kepala  desa.  Desa  ordinances may not be 
implemented without formal approval of the  bupati, who may reject any village decision which 
he regards as "conflicting with higher regulations or with public interest". The camat attends all 
LMD meetings as pengarah (director) to insure that decisions at village level are in accord with 
higher authority. He also has the obligation to "give direction" when the LMD has difficulty 
achieving consensus (mufakat) (DepDagri 1986a:17). Under specified conditions the camat may 
recommend the dismissal of the village head (Mendagri 6/1981, §28), and when he considers 
public order to be at stake, he may appoint an acting village head for no longer than a year. In 
Gianyar in 1987, two village heads were replaced by interim appointees because they had "lost 
public support" in the view of district officials. 
32.  For  example,  the  Home  Affairs  Ministerial  Instruction  on  the  role  of  the  LMD 
begins:" .. mengingat  tingkat  kemampuan  para  penyelenggara  pemerintahan  Desa  sangat 
terbatas ... " (lnst Mendagri 140-100 in Depdagri 1986b). 
33.  In the non-P.U. subak the subak head and his assistants were elected every five  years, 
whereas the P.U. counterpart had been in office for forty years without reelection, virtually since 
the permanent irrigation project had been initiated. Meetings in the P.U. subak attracted only a 
35% rate of attendance on the rare occasions when they were held. By comparison, the non-P.U. 
subak held regular monthly meetings with attendances averaging 90%. Members' participation in 
discussion was observed as being more active  and critical  (1984:238). Mobilisation  in  the 
non-P.U.subak in the form of organised work-service (gotong royong) was active for both religious 
and irrigation purposes. In the P.U. subak collective work was only rarely conducted for any 
purpose other than ritual obligations (1984:247). 
34. A parallel example of the arrogance of bureaucracy and  the adverse  consequences of 
restructuring local organisations to centrally determined ends comes from the Philippines. There 
26 too  decentralisation  policies  reshaped  the  community-level  barangay,  turning it into  a 
subservient instrument of federal government (Paget 1983:126). As in Indonesia, the government of 
the Philippines appealed  to  a  selective version of traditional  ideologies  to  'revitalize  the 
cooperative spirit', while at the same time preempting opportunities for the exercise of local 
decision-making powers. In the process of restructuring existing institutions to conform to its 
master blueprint, the Philippine government debilitated the barangay and induced a state of 
pervasive cynicism in the rural populace, from which Anderson says local institutions have not 
recovered (1982:150£0. The degradation of local organisational capacities in the Philippines, in 
Anderson's view, was "perhaps mostly an unintended consequence of the assumptions that no 
institutions and organizations worthy of the name exist or could develop indigenously in 
villages" (1982:151-52). 
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